But Facebook’s Not a Country: How to Interpret Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies by Benesch, Susan
Yale Law School 
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 
Yale Journal on Regulation Online Bulletin 
2020 
But Facebook’s Not a Country: How to Interpret Human Rights 
Law for Social Media Companies 
Susan Benesch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/jregonline 
 
86 
But Facebook’s Not a Country: How to Interpret 
Human Rights Law for Social Media Companies 
Susan Benesch† 
Private social media companies regulate much more speech than any 
government does, and their platforms are being used to bring about seri-
ous harm. Yet companies govern largely on their own, and in secret.  
To correct this, advocates have proposed that companies follow in-
ternational human-rights law.  That law–by far the world’s best-known 
rules for governing speech–could improve regulation itself, and would al-
so allow for better transparency and oversight on behalf of billions of 
people who use social media.                                              
This paper argues that for this to work, the law must first be inter-
preted to clarify how (and whether) each of its provisions are suited to 
this new purpose. For example, the law provides that speech may be re-
stricted to protect national security, as one of only five permissible bases 
for limiting speech. Governments, for which international law was writ-
ten, may regulate on that basis, but not private companies which have no 
national security to protect. 
To fill some of the gap, the paper explains and interprets the most 
relevant provisions of international human-rights law–Articles 19 and 20 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which pertain 
to freedom of expression–for use by social media companies, in novel de-
tail. 
I. Introduction 
Facebook, Inc. is quietly running the largest system of censorship the 
world has ever known, governing more human communication than any 
government does, or ever has1: billions of posts every day.2 Other social 
                                               
† Executive Director of the Dangerous Speech Project and Faculty Associate, Berkman Klein 
Center for Internet & Society, Harvard University. I am very grateful to Chinmayi Arun, Dan 
Bateyko, Matthew Bugher, Cathy Buerger, Evelyn Douek, Tonei Glavinic, David Kaye, Michael 
Lwin, Yuval Shany, and Miranda Sissons for invaluable discussions and critique, and to Dan 
Bateyko, Tonei Glavinic, and Emma Hunter for research and editing. 
1 The only country whose censorship system comes close to that of Facebook’s in number of us-
ers or volume of content regulated is China, which has fewer than one billion people online. See, 
e.g., Jon Russell, China Reaches 800 Million Internet Users, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/21/china-reaches-800-million-internet-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/WZ98-PSZN]. Facebook has more than 2.3 billion regular monthly users. See 
FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/  [https://perma.cc/5FHJ-QJ8W].  
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media companies3 also regulate speech at an astounding scale, on plat-
forms4 like YouTube.5   
It’s not only scale that makes this form of regulation new. In the 
platforms’ early days nearly all posts were private: users shared personal 
news and thoughts, often with people they knew offline. Significant pub-
lic discourse now takes place on social media, among strangers. In many 
countries, online platforms are indispensable for running election cam-
paigns, announcing presidential decisions, providing government ser-
vices6–or convincing citizens to condone mass murder and ethnic cleans-
ing.7 
Though the vast majority of online content is harmless or helpful, 
platforms are also used to spread many types of content that do signifi-
cant or grave harm to people, and that damage the public good.  The link 
between social media company decisions and real-world suffering is not 
as obvious, and the solution not as easy, as in cases of products that kill 
people directly, like the Ford Pinto with its exploding gas tank,8 or HIV-
contaminated clotting factor knowingly sold to hemophiliacs.9  
However, the harm is real. When companies seek profit by maximiz-
ing user engagement and retention, users can be, and have been, exposed 
to damaging content that leads to offline harm.10  
                                                                                                             
2 “Users post billions of pieces of content to our platform every day and send hundreds of bil-
lions of messages through our chat services.” Email from Peter Stern, Facebook Director of 
Content Policy Stakeholder Engagement, to Susan Benesch (Aug. 19, 2020, 5:46PM EST) (on 
file with author).  
3 In this paper, “social media companies” refers to firms that host and disseminate user-
generated content online. Facebook, Google, and Twitter are the best known and most discussed 
(at least in the United States). There are many others, large and small, including Reddit, Auto-
mattic, Bytedance, and companies that build and maintain chat apps or online games. 
4 In this paper “platform” is any product, app, or website on which a social media company hosts 
and disseminates user-generated content. For example, Facebook, Inc., a social media company, 
owns and operates the platforms Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp. 
5 YouTube has nearly two billion users, and sees more than 400 hours of video posted every mi-
nute. YouTube Help, Monetization Systems or “The Algorithm” Explained, GOOGLE INC.,  
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9269689 [https://perma.cc/NH4E-533S].  
6 Arthur Mickoleit, Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer to Discuss Trends, Iden-
tify Opportunities, and Guide Decision Makers, OECD 2 (2014), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/social-media-use-by-governments_5jxrcmghmk0s-en#page1 
[https://perma.cc/9WHP-FFA9].  
7See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-
facebook.html [https://perma.cc/GC8W-SGYL]; Davey Alba, How Duterte Used Facebook to 
Fuel the Philippine Drug War, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/facebook-philippines-dutertes-drug-war 
[https://perma.cc/YW6C-DKJ2]. 
8Robert Sherefkin, Lee Iacocca’s Pinto: A Fiery Failure, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 16, 2003), 
https://www.autonews.com/article/20030616/SUB/306160770/lee-iacocca-s-pinto-a-fiery-failure 
[https://perma.cc/86HM-97M3].  
9 Leemon McHenry & Mellad Khoshnood, Blood Money: Bayer's Inventory of HIV-
Contaminated Blood Products and Third World Hemophiliacs, 21 ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
RESEARCH 389-400 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24785997 [https://perma.cc/ 
UYC2-F84R].  
10 Stevenson, supra note 7; Alba, supra note 7. 
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Yet the companies decide–many millions of times every day11–which 
content to regulate and how, such as by removing it,12 posting warning 
notices,13 fact-checking,14 or making it visible to fewer people by means of 
algorithms.15 They choose which accounts to suspend or block entirely, 
and which to leave up so that their owners can continue exercising free-
dom of expression, even when that infringes on the rights of others.  
For all this regulation the companies make their own rules, frequent-
ly changing them, on their own initiative or in response to public pres-
sure, and keeping the detailed rules16 secret from the people whose 
speech is regulated under their terms. Sometimes company staff admit 
later that they erred,17 either by leaving content up or by taking it down.  
In the last several years, under pressure to regulate more effectively, plat-
forms have hired thousands more moderators, developed software to de-
tect harmful content, and constantly adjusted their rules or made excep-
tions to them.18  
Each platform has its own regulations, such as Facebook’s Commu-
nity Standards,19 which many users do not even know how to find–and 
most do not read.20  
                                               
11 Facebook alone restricts access to over one million pieces of content every day, not including 
spam. See Community Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK (May 2020), 
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/28QT-
3H8H]. 
12  See, e.g., Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://facebook.com/communitystandards 
[https://perma.cc/7VAX-BP3H]. 
13 See, e.g., Help Center, Sensitive Media Policy, TWITTER, (Nov. 2019), 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/media-policy [https://perma.cc/XY24-JB9F]. 
14 See, e.g., Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False News?, 
FACEBOOK (May 23, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/05/hard-questions-false-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/G52V-S6FT]. 
15 See, e.g., Arun Babu, Annie Liu & Jordan Zhang, New Updates to Reduce Clickbait Head-
lines, FACEBOOK (May 17, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/05/news-feed-fyi-new-updates-
to-reduce-clickbait-headlines/ [https://perma.cc/U9VG-9T42]. 
16 See Section II.B infra for an explanation of the difference between public-facing guidelines 
like Facebook’s Community Standards and the detailed, internal rules that companies use for 
regulating.  
17 See, e.g., Shona Ghosh, Google Admitted Its AI Is Making Errors When Deleting Terrorist 
Content Off YouTube, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2017, 6:43AM EST), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/google-errors-delete-terrorist-videos-youtube-researchers-
journalists-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/KZ37-7XFK]; Joachim Dagenborg, Facebook Says Will 
Learn from Mistake over Vietnam Photo, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2016, 12:10 PM EST), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-facebook-idUSKCN11I1VU [https://perma.cc/QFX8-
YG79]; Ariana Tobin, Madeleine Varner & Julia Angwin, Facebook’s Uneven Enforcement of 
Hate Speech Rules Allows Vile Posts to Stay Up, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28. 2017, 5:53 PM EST), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enforcement-hate-speech-rules-mistakes 
[https://perma.cc/8PTN-RLPR]. 
18 See, e.g., Susan Wojcicki, Expanding Our Work Against Abuse of Our Platform, YOUTUBE 
OFFICIAL BLOG (Dec. 5, 2017), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/expanding-our-work-
against-abuse-of-our [https://perma.cc/EB4B-9MCG]; Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The 
People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1648-58 
(2018). 
19 Community Standards, supra note 12. 
20 Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Pri-
vacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO., COMM. & 
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This, of course, makes users less likely to follow the rules.21 And 
those who do read them are often confused: even some company staff 
find them difficult to understand or apply clearly.22 
Thus an external source of standards is needed. The companies’ own 
rules and processes are not only confusing and obscure to users, but also 
unevenly enforced (more in some languages and countries than others), 
and subject to interference from governments. In the words of David 
Kaye, then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, they 
have “created unstable, unpredictable, and unsafe environments for users 
and intensified government scrutiny.”23  
Adhering to a single body of standards would instead give compa-
nies a source of “forceful normative responses against undue State re-
strictions”24 and would provide a basis for users to hold companies ac-
countable to follow key norms and principles. Also as ARTICLE 19, the 
NGO that champions freedom of expression worldwide, argues, applying 
human-rights law to content moderation would oblige companies to dis-
close more information about rules and enforcement, and might lead 
them to provide more effective remedies to users who feel companies 
have violated their rights.25 
Social media companies need a clear, authoritative, widely endorsed 
source of parameters for rules–and of guidance on how to regulate, in-
cluding disclosing and explaining their rules to the public. No source of 
rules for speech regulation is as widely known or formally adopted as in-
ternational human-rights law. That law’s most relevant instrument, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), has been 
ratified by nearly ninety percent of the countries in the world.26 It should 
be noted that this does not mean they comply with the treaty’s terms. The 
United States, for example, ratified with a wall of fine print–five reserva-
                                                                                                             
SOC’Y 128-47 (2020); Id., 44th Research Conference on Communication, Information & Internet 
Policy (2016) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757465 [https://perma.cc/K8ZU-N3L3]. 
21  Margaret E. Tankard & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social 
Change, 10 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 181 (2016). 
22 STEVEN LEVY, FACEBOOK: THE INSIDE STORY, 447-48, (2020). 
23 David Kaye (UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Free-
dom of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 
6, 2018). 
24 Id. 
25Side-Stepping Rights: Regulating Speech by Contract, ARTICLE 19, at 36 (2018), 
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Regulating-speech-by-contract-WEB-
v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ9P-PWDH]. 
26 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 6, 2020 04:27 
EDT), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter 
=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/W5T4-ZNYH]. 
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tions, five understandings, and four declarations27–to curb its own com-
pliance. 
Companies are enjoined to respect human-rights law (without reser-
vations), under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights which establish a “global standard of expected conduct.”28 Com-
panies like Facebook should not only respect the law but comply with it, 
due to their vast regulation of speech, especially public discourse,  Kaye 
argued in a report to the UN Human Rights Council: “While the Guiding 
Principles are non-binding, the companies’ overwhelming role in public 
life globally argues strongly for their adoption and implementation.”29 
ARTICLE 19 has also called for this extensively.30  
Companies need not–and should not–all use the same rules, just as 
countries are not required to pass the same national laws. Most social 
media platforms are used by a wide variety of people in many countries, 
for diverse purposes that call for different rules. Fortunately, with only 
two exceptions, the ICCPR does not dictate which speech should be re-
stricted.31 Instead it sets out a process: a regulatory framework to make 
sure the rules are transparent, designed to protect the relevant popula-
tions, and minimally restrictive of freedom of expression.  
However, the ICCPR and other relevant human-rights law cannot be 
used for commercial content moderation right off the shelf; it must be in-
terpreted for this novel purpose in at least two ways. First, the law was 
written and ratified for use by countries, not private companies. The 
ICCPR allows speech restrictions on only five grounds–national security, 
public order, public health, morals, and the rights and reputations of oth-
ers. No other grounds are permitted32– profit-making for example. As 
Evelyn Mary Aswad has argued, companies prioritize profit, and perhaps 
cannot be expected to put the public interest above it.33  
It would be naïve to expect companies to make decisions only in the 
public interest, but in other industries, businesses have been obliged to 
make some decisions to protect consumers, their workers, the environ-
                                               
27 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Un-
derstandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/usdocs/civilres.html [https://perma.cc/5839-6TX8]. 
28 UN, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/12/02 at 13 (2012) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/publications/hr. 
puB.12.2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V8U-QM3V]   
29 Kaye, supra note 23, at 5. 
30 ARTICLE 19, supra note 25 at 9-10, 39. 
31 Article 20 of the ICCPR requires states to prohibit propaganda for war and advocacy of na-
tional, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility, discrimination or vio-
lence, as discussed in Section III infra. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ 
pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RQ6-6EWN] [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
32 Id. at art. 19.  
33 Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 26, 52-53 (2018), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dltr/vol17/iss1/2/ [https://perma.cc/ES6W-
HBW8]. 
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ment, or the public, by means of oversight mechanisms and law. Social 
media companies should be no exception. Some provisions of human 
rights law on speech cannot apply to private enterprise, however, as de-
scribed below.  
The second area in which international human rights law must be in-
terpreted for use by social media companies is where it requires speech 
restrictions, since that language is broad and confusing. The ICCPR’s 
prohibitions of propaganda for war and incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility, or violence must be explained for application to content modera-
tion, which requires clear, specific rules for consistent decisions on a huge 
variety of posts in over a hundred languages34 and many more cultural 
contexts. Moreover, another international human rights treaty requires 
that other categories of speech be prohibited, including “all dissemination 
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.”35 This seems considerably 
broader than the ICCPR’s speech provisions, and the two treaties should 
be explicitly reconciled. 
If and when it is adequately interpreted, international human-rights 
law might serve as a useful guide for companies to regulate speech – and 
for outsiders to hold the companies accountable to an external standard. 
This should improve the companies’ rules, since the law requires that 
speech restrictions be necessary, legitimate, and provided by law.36 Users 
would be better able to understand the rules, and to hold companies ac-
countable for errors. 
Companies should indeed conform to international human-rights 
law, not merely respect it. To that end, below I offer many specific ideas 
for interpreting that law for use by private companies and by external 
bodies that are beginning to play a role in the companies’ regulation of 
speech, such as Facebook’s new Oversight Board,37 which could be a 
mechanism for improving Facebook’s speech regulation. And as Evelyn 
Douek has pointed out, importantly, companies have begun to regulate 
together in what she calls “content cartels,”38 like the Global Internet Fo-
                                               
34 Maggie Fick & Paresh Dave, Facebook's Flood of Languages Leave It Struggling to Monitor 
Content, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2019, 1:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-
languages-insight/facebooks-flood-of-languages-leave-it-struggling-to-monitor-content-
idUSKCN1RZ0DW [https://perma.cc/AD6A-DMJ5].    
35 United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. https://ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cerd.aspx, 
[https://perma.cc/2EEV-NYWH] [hereinafter ICERD]. 
36 General Comment No. 34, at ¶ 24, 33, U.N. Human Rights Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2894-AKLM]  [hereinafter GC 34]. 
37 The Oversight Board was proposed in 2018 and is expected to begin work this year. Michael 
Lwin discusses the Board in valuable detail in his own article. See Oversight Board, FACEBOOK 
(Sept. 2019), https://www.oversightboard.com/  [https://perma.cc/2Z3Q-K2EH]. 
38 Evelyn Douek, The Rise of Content Cartels, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. U. 
(Feb. 11, 2020), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-rise-of-content-cartels [https://perma.cc/ 
882J-J3N4]. 
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rum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), a consortium of tech firms that 
maintains a database of content to ban.39 
Interpreting international human-rights law for use by social media 
companies is a major endeavor, which should consider multiple sources of 
law, and many rights. In this brief essay, I focus on freedom of expression 
and on one law, the ICCPR.  
II. Social Media Companies Should Comply with International 
Human-Rights Law 
A. Social Media Companies Are Governing: Performing Some 
Limited State Functions 
International human-rights law was meant to bind states, but the 
idea of holding corporations accountable under that law is far from new: 
it emerged when other companies gained unusual forms or degrees of 
power over the exercise of human rights. In the late twentieth century, 
transnational corporations notoriously violated rights,40 so the UN com-
missioned a proposal to require corporations to comply with human-
rights obligations.41 It was never adopted. Instead the UN Secretary Gen-
eral appointed Professor John Ruggie who, after six years of discussions, 
produced the UN Guiding Principles on Business Human Rights [herein-
after UNGPs], which ask companies to “respect” human rights.42 The 
UNGPs were unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council 
in 2011 and have become the principal international instrument regarding 
companies and human rights.43  
                                               
39 GIFCT was founded in 2017 as a partnership of large social media companies, and incorpo-
rated as an NGO in 2020 with companies on its governing board and an advisory committee of 
government and civil society representatives. See Chloe Hadavas, The Future of Free Speech 
Online May Depend on This Database, SLATE (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:00 AM EST), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/gifct-content-moderation-free-speech-online.html 
[https://perma.cc/SU39-NG5V]. 
40 For example, Nike relied on factories that abused workers in many countries and Shell was 
associated with a military crackdown that left thousands dead in Nigeria. John Gerard Ruggie, 
The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 7-8 
(Corp. Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 67, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CK84-NEXJ].  
41 Pini Pavel Miretski & Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, The UN “Norms on the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”: A 
Requiem, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 5, 7 (2012) [https://perma.cc/QET6-66LU]. 
42 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 at 17-18 (2011), www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VWD-J74K] [hereinafter UNGPs]. 
43 Mariette Van Huijstee, Victor Ricco & Laura Ceresna-Chaturvedi, How to Use the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights in Company Research and Advocacy, The Centre 
for Research on Multinational Corporations (Nov. 2012), at 11. https://corporatejustice.org/how-
to-use-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights-in-company-research-and-
advocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG23-NP3S]   
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The UNGPs focus more on process than on outcomes, leaving room 
for many levels of commitment. They indicate that companies ought to 
develop human-rights policies, conduct due diligence,44 “avoid infringing 
on the human rights of others,” and should “address adverse human 
rights impacts with which they are involved.”45  
Social media companies have human-rights impacts of great magni-
tude on at least half of the world’s population.46 They can limit not only 
what people say (or write) but what they see and read. When exercised in 
public spaces, such powers are reserved for governments. The companies 
wield them in virtual spaces with many public features: what Yochai 
Benkler called networked public spheres.47  
This extraordinary, transnational power and influence sets the com-
panies apart from any other private enterprise. When platforms are used 
for exchanging information that is vital for civic life, the owners and staff 
of the platforms influence the political, cultural, and economic develop-
ment of entire societies. In many countries, social media platforms have 
become essential spaces for public discourse, with major implications for 
political life, collective well-being, and public order.48  
U.S. President Donald Trump is far from the only political figure to 
communicate and campaign on social media. In the Philippines, for ex-
ample, President Rodrigo Duterte’s election in 2016 was significantly 
credited to campaigning on Facebook, by far the dominant platform in 
his country.49  
The very functions of routine governance are also carried out, in-
creasingly, on social media platforms. Not only political figures but the 
very institutions of government now communicate and provide services 
via social media, in many countries. “Presence and activity on social me-
dia is no longer a question of choice for most governments,” wrote the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in a 
working paper. In most of the 34 OECD countries, executive branches 
maintain both Facebook and Twitter accounts, as do many agencies and 
ministries, the paper notes.50 
In sum, social media companies have acquired more regulatory pow-
er of a kind traditionally exercised by states, than any other private en-
terprise has since human rights law was created. Though the UNGPs are 
cautious and aspirational, the companies should develop robust, rigorous, 
                                               
44 UNGPs, supra note 43.  
45 Id. at 13 (Principle 11). 
46 Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: 3.8 Billion People Use Social Media, WE ARE SOCIAL (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://wearesocial.com/blog/2020/01/digital-2020-3-8-billion-people-use-social-media 
[https://perma.cc/42YE-HBLQ]. 
47 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 261 (2006). 
48 See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 7. 
49 Alba, supra note 7. 
50 Mickoleit, supra note 6, at 1. 
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transparent means to respect and comply with international human-rights 
norms.  
Other observers have been noting for years that internet companies 
govern, without meaningful accountability to the people under their con-
trol.   
In a landmark 2012 book, Rebecca MacKinnon called the companies 
“sovereigns operating without the consent of the networked.”51 In some 
cases, the leaders of companies have themselves noted that they are 
wielding sovereign powers. Kate Klonick began her 2018 article aptly ti-
tled The New Governors with a remark from Mark Zuckerberg: “In a lot 
of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. 
We have this large community of people, and more than other technology 
companies we’re really setting policies.”52 Klonick called Facebook and 
other companies “private, self-regulating entities” that have developed 
such detailed rules and systems for moderating online content that they 
constitute systems of governance.53  
Tarleton Gillespie noted that defining the boundaries of freedom of 
expression online is “enormous cultural power held by a few deeply in-
vested stakeholders, and it is being done behind closed doors, making it 
difficult for anyone else to inspect or challenge.”54 Regulating in the dark 
does significant harm: “[T]he biggest threat this private system of govern-
ance poses to democratic culture is the loss of a fair opportunity to partic-
ipate, which is compounded by the system’s lack of direct accountability 
to its users.”55 
Fortunately, human rights law requires that rules be transparent, so 
that the people who live under them can understand and challenge them. 
Applying that law would also confer other benefits, such as giving com-
panies a stronger basis to resist improper pressure from states to suppress 
speech. 
Finally, since social media platforms serve very different purposes, 
the companies will (and may) implement the law differently. None is as 
large or powerful as Facebook, and some, such as dating apps or gaming 
platforms, do not host significant public discourse.  
Under the UNGPs all private enterprises of any size or “operational 
context”56 have a responsibility to respect international human-rights law, 
but “[n]evertheless, the scale and complexity of the means through which 
                                               
51 REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR 
INTERNET FREEDOM, at xxiii-iv.   
52 Klonick, supra note 18, at 1599 (citing DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD, 254 (2010)).  
53 Id. at 1603. 
54 TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT 
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enterprises meet that responsibility may vary according to these factors 
and with the severity of the enterprise’s adverse human-rights impacts.”57 
Accordingly, a platform’s size, target audience, or intended use should 
not determine whether its owner should use ICCPR standards as the ba-
sis for content moderation.  
The scope and severity of human-rights impacts should be the key 
factor: when significant harm arises from content spreading on a compa-
ny’s platform or platforms, its obligation to adhere to human-rights law 
grows accordingly. Though some apps are free from propaganda for war, 
for example, most have some content that violates human rights. Users 
banned from one site flee to smaller, niche services like LinkedIn,58 Tik-
Tok,59 and even Pornhub60 to continue spreading harmful content. Also, 
platforms grow and morph quickly. When Mark Zuckerberg and others 
created Facebook in their dorm rooms,61 none imagined what it would 
become. Or Amazon’s Twitch livestreaming service was created for gam-
ers, but its largest category is now non-gaming content.62  
B. Private Regulation is Flawed in Ways that International Human-
Rights Law Can Improve 
A single substantive basis for content moderation would help to 
solve several of the fundamental problems of tech companies’ regulatory 
systems for content. In brief summary, these are: 1) that the rules are ob-
scure, confusing, or totally unknown to those who live under them; 2) that 
companies too often make wrong decisions that cause a variety of forms 
of serious harm to people including but not limited to their users; 3) that 
the companies’ leaders and staff are imposing their values on more than 
half of the world’s population; and 4) that governments can carry out 
shadow censorship by putting quiet but vigorous pressure on companies.  
                                               
57 Id. at 18. 
58Craig Silverman, The Partisan Meme Wars Have Come for LinkedIn, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 
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JAZEERA (Apr. 16, 2020),  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/banned-facebook-twitter-uk-
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hub, QUARTZ (Nov. 13, 2019), https://qz.com/1747617/chinese-users-go-to-pornhub-to-spread-
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61 Levy, supra note 23, at 8. 
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1. Companies’ Rules Are Obscure, Confusing, or Unknown 
to Users 
For almost everyone outside the companies that make and apply 
them, platform rules are arcane and obscure. They are typically presented 
as thousands of words of fine print. Facebook’s Community Standards, 
for example, have 26 sections–many of which include links to other doc-
uments–and a reader must navigate through each of six chapters sepa-
rately.63   
Users are unlikely to do so, to say the least. In a 2017 study, all 543 
college students in a laboratory experiment clicked the “Join” button for 
a new social network, asserting that they had read its rules–in which they 
gave up their future first-born children (and all of their data) in para-
graph 2.3.1.64  
Even if one read the publicly accessible rules, they are just a rough 
or even misleading sketch compared with the highly detailed manuals 
that company staff and contractors use when regulating content.65 For ex-
ample, a ProPublica investigation revealed that although Facebook pro-
hibits hate speech against identity groups like Black people or women, 
and asserted this in its public rules, its internal rules made exceptions for 
“subsets” of people such as female drivers or Black drivers.66 Hate speech 
against subsets was acceptable on Facebook, but no one could have 
gleaned that from the public rules known as Community Standards.   
   As a result, even the most curious and diligent users cannot 
properly understand the vast private regulations that govern their activity 
online. Human-rights law should improve this problem since it requires 
that speech-restricting rules be precise, and accessible to those who live 
under them.  
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2. Companies Harm People with Wrong Decisions, Both to 
Remove Content and to Leave It Up 
When social media companies both make and enforce their rules, 
they must navigate a landscape of tangible harms that can result from 
their own action, and inaction. The gravest of these harms is mass vio-
lence, and Facebook and other companies have been excoriated for not 
taking down content that incites or inspires it 67 in many countries.68 For 
example, in March 2018, Sri Lankan rioters burned down Muslim busi-
nesses and places of worship.69 In an open letter, the Colombo-based 
Center for Policy Alternatives drew attention to Facebook posts during 
the riots like one in which the author “called for the ‘killing of all Mus-
lims, without sparing even a child, because they are dogs.’”70 Six days af-
ter a user reported the post, Facebook responded that it did not violate 
any company rule.71 Social media companies also err in removing content 
that is vital for education or for protecting human rights. For example the 
Syrian Archive, a project that documents human-rights abuses, has urged 
YouTube for years to preserve video evidence that can be vital for bring-
ing perpetrators to justice.72 Still YouTube has taken down over 340,000 
of the Archive’s 1.7 million videos.73  
YouTube’s standard appeals process has not worked well for cor-
recting the takedowns, in part because only the person who posted a vid-
eo can plead for its reinstatement. This is impossible when that person 
has been imprisoned or killed.74 
Also, moderators often mistakenly remove content that is meant to 
educate against hatred, not express or promote it. For example, YouTube 
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cited its hate speech policy when removing a historical montage of the 
U.S. Army destroying Nazi emblems75 and when suspending the account 
of history teacher Scott Allsop for hosting a channel with archival Nazi 
footage for his students.76 
Adhering to international human-rights law should diminish such 
mistakes since it requires that any restrictions on speech be necessary and 
proportionate, that is, the least restrictive possible. When mistakes recur, 
users would have a new basis for challenging content moderation rules, 
and the ways in which they are enforced. The law should also reduce fail-
ures to take down dangerous content, since it requires the prohibition of 
advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility, discrimination, 
or violence, and of propaganda for war. These provisions are described in 
detail below. 
3. Companies Are Imposing Their Own Values 
The rules and standards social media companies apply to users–and 
the values behind them–have their roots not in deliberative processes that 
take into account the norms and diversity of internet users, but rather ad 
hoc decision-making, mainly by a handful of U.S. lawyers.77 While com-
panies have made significant changes to their rules over time, they still 
rely upon vague and disproportionately American concepts. Some com-
panies’ leaders have realized that this is unfair. Mark Zuckerberg said in 
2018: “[W]hat I would really like to do is find a way to get our policies set 
in a way that reflects the values of the community, so I am not the one 
making those decisions. . . . I think that there is likely a better process, 
which I haven’t figured out yet.” 78 Facebook has since created the Over-
sight Board, but its own policymaking process hasn’t changed much. 
Its policies are based on five values: voice, authenticity, safety, priva-
cy, and dignity.79 Voice–essentially freedom of expression–is “para-
mount,” restricted only when it impinges on one of the other four val-
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ues.80 In some cases, content that would otherwise be restricted is left on 
the platform if Facebook deems it to be sufficiently “newsworthy” or 
otherwise in the public interest.81 Facebook says it “evaluate[s] the public 
interest value of the piece of speech against the risk of harm,” through a 
“holistic and comprehensive” process that “account[s] for international 
human rights standards,” 82 including Article 19 of the ICCPR.83  
While this public commitment is somewhat reassuring, accounting 
for human-rights standards as part of a holistic evaluation is very differ-
ent than placing them at the core of your decision-making process. Ulti-
mately, Facebook determines “risk of harm” and “public interest” unilat-
erally, and imposes its decisions on billions of people.84  
4. Shadow Censorship 
Company content moderation is also used as a means for states to 
carry out silent and invisible censorship, by pressuring companies to take 
down content through undisclosed private channels or through govern-
ment “Internet Referral Units” (IRUs). As Kaye reported, “Some States 
have pushed for social media companies and other hosts of user-
generated content to monitor and take down content on their own initia-
tive, rather than wait for law-based requests from the Government.”85 In 
some cases, governments claim that their requests are under color of na-
tional law, but they fail to use legal channels designed to provide due 
process and balance competing rights (if such protections exist at all);86 in 
others, they are Mafia-style negotiations, coercing compliance from the 
companies by promising to ignore antitrust concerns,87 raising the pro-
spect of intermediary liability for user content, or outright threats to 
block access to the platform entirely in that country.88  
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Companies could use human-rights law as a tool to resist such pres-
sure. It would not work magic, especially on governments with authori-
tarian tendencies (even those that have ratified the ICCPR), but it could 
help.  Some governments are responsive to international-law arguments, 
and susceptible to being shamed for flouting them.89 Also, companies like 
Facebook could use their vast power to resist improper government inter-
ference more vigorously, especially in countries where political leaders 
rely heavily on the use of their platforms. It would be difficult to ban (or 
even to slow access to) Facebook in the Philippines or Myanmar, for in-
stance, where that platform is such a vital tool for social, economic, and 
political life.  
Finally, grounding policies and enforcement in international human-
rights standards would make it easier for users to understand what the 
rules are and on what rationales they are based. From there, it should be 
easier to influence companies to improve their rules to prevent harm, and 
enforce them more accurately and consistently. 
III. Which International Human-Rights Law Should Companies Use? 
International human rights law is found in a variety of treaties and 
declarations, but the UNGPs instruct businesses to focus on a few sources 
“at a minimum”: the International Bill of Rights and the International 
Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.90 For speech regulation, the relevant documents are in the Bill 
of Rights, which includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR).  
The UDHR famously notes in its preamble that every individual and 
“every organ of society . . . shall strive” to promote respect for human 
rights and their universal and effective recognition. 91 This obviously in-
cludes companies, as the renowned human-rights scholar Louis Henkin 
noted.92 The UDHR sets out the rights to freedom of expression and 
opinion in its Article 19, but includes no corresponding obligations.93 It is 
the ICCPR that offers international law’s most relevant, detailed frame-
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work for restrictions on freedom of expression, the principal right that 
social media companies both facilitate and restrict. That treaty, which has 
been ratified by 173 of the world’s 195 countries,94 describes only two 
types of speech that states must prohibit, in Article 20: propaganda for 
war and advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to hostility, discrimination or violence.95 Those forms of ex-
pression were familiar to the diplomats who wrote the ICCPR in the 
wake of World War II, and they remain all too relevant today, though 
some of the wording is now out of date. Still, they represent only a tiny 
proportion of all the content that companies restrict under their own 
rules. 
The ICCPR’s provisions on which speech may be restricted are 
found in its own Article 19, and are suited to speech regulation by social 
media companies in two senses. First, Article 19 requires that all re-
strictions be “provided by law.”96 The UN Human Rights Committee, the 
body charged with interpreting the ICCPR, has clarified that a norm can 
be considered a law.97 Therefore Facebook’s “community standards” and 
other companies’ rules can qualify–as long as they are precise, and clearly 
explained to the public. A norm “must be formulated with sufficient pre-
cision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly, 
and it must be made accessible to the public,” according to the Commit-
tee.98 This is far from the case now. Companies have been formulating 
their norms with increasing precision for internal use, and they have been 
publishing versions of their rules to the public, but those are more general 
and vague, as described supra in Section II(B)(i).   
The ICCPR’s flexibility also makes it apt for use by social media 
companies. Instead of specifying which kinds of content may be restrict-
ed, it identifies the terms on which restrictions may be imposed, and re-
quires a transparent and balanced regulatory process. Its provisions can 
therefore be applied to a wide variety of rules by very different online 
platforms.   
Another international human-rights treaty, the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD),99 is directly relevant to online content regulation, and its lan-
guage conflicts with that of the ICCPR, by requiring the prohibition of 
different, and likely much more, speech. The ICERD’s Article 4  requires 
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states to “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, 
as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or 
group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin.”100  
“All…ideas based on racial superiority or hatred” is surely much 
broader than the ICCPR’s Article 20 injunction against advocacy of ha-
tred that constitutes incitement. This apparent conflict has not been re-
solved or explained by the relevant authorities, though the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the UN body charged with in-
terpreting that treaty, seems to have deferred to the ICCPR by directing 
that when speech is criminalized under Article 4 of the ICERD, “the ap-
plication of criminal sanctions should be governed by principles of legali-
ty, proportionality, and necessity.” 101. In that light, and since ICERD is 
not part of the International Bill of Rights that the UNGPs direct com-
panies to follow, the next section focuses on the ICCPR. 
IV. How the ICCPR Articles 19 and 20 Should Be Used by 
Companies 
The ICCPR’s Articles 19 and 20 set a floor and a ceiling for re-
strictions on speech, and should be the core of a regulatory framework 
for companies.  
A. Article 19  
The ICCPR’s Article 19 protects the right to seek and receive infor-
mation of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and through any media.102 Ar-
ticle 19(3) permits restriction on speech as long as each restriction is pro-
vided by law, necessary (and proportionate), and legitimate. The last of 
the three prongs means that each restriction must be intended to protect 
at least one of five interests: national security, public order, public health, 
morals, and the rights and reputations of others.103 State parties may not 
restrict speech for reasons other than those five. Also, no restriction may 
violate any other provision in the ICCPR, such as its ban on discrimina-
tion.104 The three prongs of the Article 19(3) test have been explained by 
the Human Rights Committee, UN Special Rapporteurs, and other UN 
bodies. What follows are the relevant details, with my proposed applica-
tion to social media companies.  
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1. “Provided by Law”  
Though social media companies cannot make laws as such, their 
rules would be considered “provided by law” as long as they were “made 
accessible to the public” and “formulated with sufficient precision to en-
able an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly”105 since the 
Human Rights Committee has clarified that norms qualify as long as 
these conditions are met. But most platforms’ rules manifestly do not 
meet this standard. Twitter’s CEO Jack Dorsey conceded to the U.S. 
Congress in 2018 that there is “a whole lot of confusion” about Twitter’s 
rules and how they are enforced, and said, “I believe if you were to go to 
our rules today and sit down with a cup of coffee, you would not be able 
to understand them.”106 Indeed, Evelyn Mary Aswad described the 
vagueness of Twitter’s rules in detail, in her instructive effort to apply the 
ICCPR’s requirements to Twitter.107 The confusion has tangible effects. 
As David Kaye has pointed out, it disproportionately harms the same 
people who are often targets of hate online: “The vagueness of hate 
speech and harassment policies has triggered complaints of inconsistent 
policy enforcement that penalizes minorities while reinforcing the status 
of dominant or powerful groups.”108 
To “enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly,” 
detailed rules should be made accessible to outsiders.109 The moderators’ 
manuals give instructions for applying the standards to specific cases, as 
regulations are used to interpret statutes. Companies have long resisted 
releasing their manuals, saying that this would allow bad actors to “game 
the system”–to find ways of remaining just barely on the permissible side 
of a rule, or, more generally, ways of posting vicious or harmful content 
while avoiding takedown. This is not persuasive. First, most laws or rules 
draw lines between prohibited and permitted conduct–that is what law is–
so conduct anywhere on the permitted side of the line is considered ac-
ceptable. If not, the line should be moved. Second, users who are deter-
mined to post harmful content and evade removal can extrapolate where 
the lines are, by testing the system with a variety of posts from a variety 
of accounts. Third, vague public rules give companies discretion to make 
exceptions without owning up to it.110 Disclosure would limit this. In any 
case, to comply with Article 19(3), companies must publish rules in suffi-
cient detail to allow outsiders to understand where the lines are. 
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2. “Necessary”  
To be necessary under 19(3), as the Human Rights Committee and 
Kaye have explained, a restriction must be more than merely useful, rea-
sonable or desirable.111 It must also be strictly necessary and proportion-
ate, meaning that the restriction is the least intrusive way of achieving the 
desired end, and that it is proportionate to that end.112 
This is of special relevance to social media companies, since they 
have many ways of restricting content–arguably more than those availa-
ble to states. Companies can of course remove content or shut down ac-
counts. These strong measures are the most-discussed options, but as I 
have argued elsewhere,113 they do not prevent harm very well since 1) by 
the time content is removed, harm has already been done and 2) it is easy 
to post the same or similar content again.  
To protect freedom of expression and to prevent further harm, it is 
vital to try–and measure the effectiveness of–other interventions in keep-
ing with this prong of Article 19(3). The best method is of course preven-
tion: to persuade people not to post harmful content in the first place. 
Companies have begun to experiment with this a bit, by sending users 
messages intended to shift behavioral norms,114 requiring users to verify 
their identities,115 or temporarily suspending them, a tactic that has inevi-
tably been nicknamed "time-outs."116  
Companies also use other methods that are less restrictive than re-
moving content or accounts entirely, such as downranking, or making 
content less accessible to fewer people on a platform.117 On messaging 
                                               
111 Id.  
112 GC 34, supra note 36, at ¶ 22. See also David Kaye (UN Special Rapporteur on the Promo-
tion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expres-
sion, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015).  
113 Susan Benesch, Proposals for Improved Regulation of Harmful Online Content, in 
REDUCING ONLINE HATE SPEECH: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES AND 
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 247-306 (Yuval Shany ed., Israel Democracy Institute 2020). 
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Abuse on Twitter, MEDIUM (Apr. 6, 2018), 
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116 Twitter Rules Enforcement January to June 2019, TWITTER, https://transparency. 
twitter.com/en/twitter-rules-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/UD8T-VYQG].  
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lence in Sri Lanka and to hide holocaust denial. See, for example, Facebook’s response to a May 
2020 Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) on Sri Lanka, disclosing that it had demoted 
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apps like WhatsApp, they have limited the number of other accounts to 
which a user may forward content.118 Also, the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil has encouraged states to test less restrictive measures against religious 
hatred, such as education and promoting interfaith dialogue.119  
Finally, as Aswad asserted, to pass the “necessity” test companies 
must determine whether the measures they have chosen in fact achieve 
the stated aim(s). “To illustrate,” she wrote, “if a company deletes posts 
or bans users from its platform, it needs to assess if that is helping create 
communities that are, for example, resilient to radicalization, knowledge-
able about misinformation online, and tolerant. Similarly, a company 
needs to consider whether such measures cause harmful speech to fester 
on smaller platforms and what impact that is having on the legitimate 
aim.” (citations omitted).120  
This is a vital point. In complying with this requirement, companies 
would make powerful, public interest-protecting use of their mountains 
of data of many kinds, including on the details of rule-breaking. They 
would likely discover invaluable information about how to diminish 
harmful content online. Since they would be obliged to share their find-
ings to demonstrate that they have complied with the necessity prong,121  
they would build up a valuable, shared trove of evidence-based 
knowledge on how to diminish harm.  
3. “Legitimate,” That Is, Meant to Protect One or More of 
Five Interests.122  
Aswad asked whether this prong can realistically be applied to com-
panies, since their main goal is to maximize profit. In my view, social me-
dia companies can and must be obliged to protect the public interest, just 
as companies in other sectors have been obliged–by law and also by pub-
lic pressure–to pollute less, stop employing children, build safer cars, and 
so forth. Moreover, social media companies are already making decisions 
regarding the public interest, from trying to limit the spread of disinfor-
mation and extremist content to reducing personal online abuse–whether 
their motivations are altruistic or not. Profit-seeking can align with the 
public interest, where companies moderate content to meet the expecta-
                                                                                                             
Intent of Those Who Deny That,” VOX: RECODE (July 18, 2018), 
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119 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12, 2011). 
120 Aswad, supra note 33, at 51.  
121 Data sharing would have to be done cautiously, of course, and protect rights including priva-
cy. Michael Karanicolas has suggested using national right to information laws and international 
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tions of their users and advertisers. This self-interest often overlaps with 
the legitimate interests discussed above, but also supports restrictions on 
various other types of content ostensibly not covered by Article 19 in-
cluding spam or clickbait.123  
Even when using Article 19 of the ICCPR as the basis for content 
restrictions, companies must not make decisions based on all five of the 
“legitimacy” grounds. No company may regulate based on national secu-
rity, since that would be an intrusion on the sovereignty of a state. When 
a state itself orders a company to suppress content on legitimate national 
security grounds, the company must comply, but national security should 
come into its own decision-making only when states themselves use it im-
properly, trying to force companies to take down content on spurious na-
tional security grounds. This is all too common: as the Human Rights 
Committee has pointed out, states often try to limit freedom of expres-
sion on dubious arguments that they are protecting national security.124 
Companies are, of course, required to accept the legitimate application of 
national laws. 
Protecting public order is also often used as a dubious basis for gov-
ernment repression of speech, or even for shutting down all access to the 
internet.125 Companies must resist this. Since protection of public order is 
not constrained by national boundaries, they may regulate to prevent se-
vere disruptions to public order, such as mass violence, of course in keep-
ing with the “necessity” prong of Article 19(3).  
Regarding the next ground, morals, Facebook and other companies 
already regulate on this basis. Facebook famously bans nudity, for exam-
ple.126 It purports to use the same rules for the whole world127 though the 
meaning of morality varies greatly: some cultures wink at public displays 
of nudity, for example, and others forbid them. To allow for variations, 
companies that operate in many countries might adjust their rules to re-
spect prevailing norms, as long as they still adhere to human-rights law. 
Companies could seek input from local, non-government councils of local 
advisors, as I have proposed elsewhere.128 
The rights and reputations of others are often much easier to dam-
age online than offline, whether through long-recognized harms like 
slander and libel, or newer ones like doxing and distribution of noncon-
sensual pornography.129 While some remedies exist under national law, 
                                               
123 See, e.g., Babu, Liu & Zhang, supra note 15. 
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2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66317/contesting-the-legality-of-internet-shutdowns/ 
[https://perma.cc/T8B6-S3MF]. 
126 Community Standards, supra note 12, at § 14. 
127 Bickert, supra note 75. 
128 Benesch, supra note 113, at Proposal 4.  
129 For a list of such harms, see id., at Part I. 
But Facebook’s Not a Country 
107 
they are poorly suited to the online context; regulation by social media 
companies can be much faster and more effective and is therefore vital. 
Legal remedies generally focus on holding a handful of offenders ac-
countable after harm has been done, rather than limiting its impact in real 
time; they face jurisdictional issues when content crosses borders; and in 
many cases are simply not designed to address novel problems. However, 
“rights and reputations,” if understood broadly, could be used as a giant 
umbrella to cover almost any content moderation issue, so its scope 
should be clarified. For example, a person might fear damage to their 
reputation from an online insult, but banning all insults would be much 
too broad an interpretation of Article 19. 
Finally, social media companies can and should regulate to protect 
public health: both to spread useful information and to limit the spread of 
dangerous disinformation.130 As the COVID-19 pandemic has demon-
strated painfully well, protecting public health131 and spreading disinfor-
mation intended to damage it132 are both transnational enterprises, which 
make them well suited to regulation by social media companies.  
Several companies already regulate in such ways. When Pinterest 
staff realized their platform was being used to spread anti-vaccine disin-
formation, it stopped returning search results for related terms; today 
such searches produce only content from public health organizations.133 
Facebook downranks such misinformation, as well as sensational health 
claims and products being marketed with health claims.134 Google prohib-
its videos on YouTube that promote harmful remedies and cures.135 The 
COVID-19 pandemic has led to stronger and more varied regulation: in 
addition to downranking misinformation and sensational claims, compa-
nies are fact-checking misinformation and displaying educational messag-
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es from health authorities,136 removing content that contradicts public 
health guidance,137 and banning advertising for products like hand sani-
tizer, disinfecting wipes, and test kits138 (to reduce profiteering). 139 In 
sum, the public health basis for speech regulation offers companies an es-
pecially large opportunity for protecting the public interest. 
B. Article 20  
Article 20 describes two forms of content that must be prohibited, 
adhering always to the terms of Article 19. Both forms–propaganda for 
war and incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence–are insuffi-
ciently clear for regulation by companies, so I offer some clarification be-
low. 
Propaganda for war was such a major focus at the United Nations 
when the ICCPR was being drafted in the late 1940s that it became one 
of only two forms of speech that the treaty effectively prohibits. It has 
gotten short shrift in international law and UN proceedings since then,140 
perhaps since governments themselves are the source of much propagan-
da for war as Michael G. Kearney has noted.141  
Still this much is clear. First, the term “war” applies only to wars of 
aggression in contravention of international law, not advocacy of self-
determination or the right to self-determination and independence, and 
not civil wars.142  
The use of the term “propaganda” instead of “incitement” indicates 
that the drafters of the ICCPR meant to prohibit a broader category of 
content than directly calling for war, or inciting a population to condone 
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it.143 They understood that turning one group of people violently against 
another takes time, and repeated messages.144 
After extended debate, they “felt that a provision which was limited 
to prohibiting incitement to war would have little chance of securing a 
lasting peace and preventing future conflicts,” Kearney reports.145 Instead 
they chose to prohibit “the repeated and insistent expression of an opin-
ion for the purpose of creating a climate of hatred and lack of under-
standing between the peoples of two or more countries, in order to bring 
them eventually to armed conflict.” 146 
It might take courage for a social media company to restrict or re-
move content on the basis of Article 20(1)–and the potential benefit is 
enormous. As noted in Section II.B(iv), companies have more power in 
dealing with some governments than they have so far used.  
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR requires countries to prohibit by law 
“[a]ny advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.” This unusual construc-
tion, with its use of both the terms “hatred” and “hostility” and also both 
the terms “advocacy” and “incitement,” has inspired much confusion and 
debate. Article 20(2) is also somewhat outdated in naming only three ba-
ses for identity–nationality, race, and religion–not others that are found 
in some national laws and in the rules of social media companies, such as 
age, gender, sexual orientation, refugee status, or caste. 
To clarify Article 20(2), then-UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Navanethem Pillay in 2012 launched a project which led to a UN 
document known as the Rabat Plan of Action.147 It indicates that “‘ha-
tred’ and ‘hostility’ refer to intense and irrational emotions of opprobri-
um, enmity and detestation towards the target group; the term 'advocacy' 
is to be understood as requiring an intention to promote hatred publicly 
towards the target group; and the term 'incitement' refers to statements 
about national, racial or religious groups which create an imminent risk 
of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons belonging to those 
groups.”148 This presents several questions, including how social media 
companies, or anyone else, are to gauge when there is an imminent risk.  
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The Rabat Plan suggests a six-part threshold test for speech to be 
criminalized: context, speaker, intent, content and form of the speech, ex-
tent of the speech act, and likelihood, including imminence.149 However, 
imminence is a poor standard for online content moderation. For exam-
ple, if companies wait to respond to dangerous content until mass vio-
lence is imminent, it is usually too late to prevent it. 
The Rabat plan also indicates that there must be intent to incite.150 
Intent can be very difficult to discern, especially online, and is often vari-
able: frequently the person who originates inflammatory content intends 
to incite violence, but people who share it do not–or vice versa.  
The Rabat test bears promise, but needs to be adapted for use in 
online content moderation. Another test that may be useful is the analyt-
ical framework for “dangerous speech,” which I have defined as any form 
of human communication that can increase the risk that its audience will 
condone or take part in violence against another group.151  Also, the Ra-
bat test may be used most effectively in conjunction with sanctions other 
than removing content, such as restrictions on particular accounts or or-
ganizations. Finally, like other restrictions on speech, Article 20’s prohibi-
tions are subject to the legality, necessity, and legitimacy prongs in Arti-
cle 19.152 
V. Conclusion 
I hope the ideas above will contribute to useful new discussion, and 
to further interpretation of international human-rights law for use by so-
cial media companies. There is plenty of work to be done. Without it, ap-
plying international law could make corporate content moderation more 
confused and ineffective, not less so. 
  
In that light, I conclude by posing a few of many outstanding ques-
tions about how such companies might use–and comply with–the law. 
 
• How should international human rights law contend with 
platforms that are end-to-end encrypted so that companies 
do not have access to content, as in the case of WhatsApp? 
Does this call for a different regulatory standard? 
• What does “least restrictive means” mean in the context of 
platform policies, taking into account such features as en-
cryption and objectives like user privacy? 
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• How is compliance with Article 19’s legitimacy prong to be 
evaluated where companies regulate for several reasons, in-
cluding some that are, and others that are not, specified in 
the treaty? 
• States are permitted to enter reservations to a treaty as part 
of ratification. Should there be some analogous process for 
companies if they are otherwise unwilling to subscribe to the 
law?  
